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Cash, Schools, and Immigrants: The
Effects of Income and Education on
Xenophobia in South Africa
John David Clark

Introduction
Ethnic tension has long been a part of South Africa's history, most prominently
with racial segregation during the apartheid years. In 1994, white minority rule was
replaced with black majority rule, and the years following the breakup of apartheid
saw a decrease in tensions between whites and other South Africans. However, despite this easing of tensions, problems still persist and a new trend in recent years
has been violence against immigrants from other African countries, perpetrated by
black South Africans. This problem is troubling and poses serious implications for
the future of a multiethnic and democratic state like South Africa. Some of the more
prominent reprisals against immigrants have been recent attacks in squatter camps
in May 2008. These were carried out by local residents against immigrants. Another
recent example has been government action used to "clean up" before the FIFA
World Cup. The government paid local residents to forcibly evict immigrant squatters. These eviction squads were nicknamed "red ants" because of the bright red
overalls and helmets the government uniformed them with. One red ant said, "It's
our land and we have the right to help the authorities move them. If the municipality
asks us to destroy these cockroaches then we'll do that and flatten their homes to
dust" (Sunday Times 2010). Statements like these sound all too similar to those used in
justifying Rwanda's genocide and seem ominous for South Africa.
This study attempts to answer the question of what effect income and education
have on xenophobia. Although measuring education and income levels is relatively
straightforward, one of the major problems with measuring xenophobia is that few
people are willing to admit xenophobic tendencies. This problem is especially com25
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pounded in a place like South Africa, where the last decade and a half has been
devoted to the idea of ethnic integration and creating a "rainbow nation." South Africans deal with racial discourses on an almost daily basis and, therefore, have a good
idea of what society expects in relation to other races. In such a setting, traditional
surveys are certainly inadequate. One recent innovation in measuring attitudes on
sensitive topics is the list experiment. This appears to participants to be a short survey
asking them to tell the number of items that make them angry or that they do not like,
etc. (note, it does not ask which items). In reality, the trick is that the treatment survey
has one additional item, an item that appears to fit with the others on the list. Any
difference between the mean number of items in the control and treatment groups
is attributed to the extra question. The list format appears to promise participants
anonymity and privacy, since they surmise, correctly, that researchers cannot identify
which specific items make subjects angry. However, the average difference between
groups produces an average treatment effect of adding the extra item.
Data was collected in three townships in South Africa during the summer of
2009. The areas in question are all relatively poor, most residents only finished secondary schooling, and many have only a few years of formal education. The survey
consisted of the list experiment and several background questions. In this study, I
look at the answers to the various list experiments and see how they relate to income and education levels. There were two questions, each with two treatments. The
various questions and treatments dealt with xenophobia in general, as well as how
it can influence elections. Some of the questions also deal with the ethnicity of South
African presidential candidates but can also provide insights into xenophobia against
non-South African ethnicities, since these questions also deal with racial attitudes.
After comparing high and low income and education, the results indicate that income and education had no effect on the xenophobic attitudes of the people in these
townships. These results were statistically significant, at the 95 percent and 99 percent
levels in many cases. This lack of education or income effects could be because the education and income levels are still too low to have an effect, or it could mean that income
and education are not as effective in decreasing xenophobia as would be hoped for. It
could also imply the relationship between income, education, and xenophobia are more
complex and need to be studied more thoroughly in future research.

Literature Review
There are many arguments as to what causes xenophobia and anti-immigrant
tension. Although I will only discuss income and education in depth, I will list other
arguments and explanations. These include scapegoating (see Johnson 1996, 111; Citrin et al. 1997; and Noyes 2019), the influence of populists and demagogues (see
Rydgren 2003; Collier 2003: 58-9; Crush 2000; and Ransford and McDonald 2001),
resource scarcity from which I base one of my explanations), and in the specific case
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of South Africa, a "culture of violence" (see BBC Online 2002; and UNODC 2010)
Although these may matter in explaining xenophobia, I will focus on the potential
impact of income and education.
There are two broad arguments for why people with lower education or lower income oppose immigration. The first is resource scarcity and the second is a cultural effect. The logic behind a resource scarcity is that if immigrants come into a labor market
with limited jobs, then they can significantly increase competition for employment, and
see locals as a the cause of unemployment and other social problems. The logic behind
a cultural effect is that as people become more educated, they tend to be more accepting of other ethnicities and backgrounds. They would be less likely to react violently
or resort to xenophobic attitudes. I will first discuss literature on the resource scarcity
model and then briefly discuss some research on the cultural argument.
One of the most common explanations for animosity toward immigrants is that
immigration increases competition for resources by creating resource scarcity. There
are several researchers who have shown resource scarcity is a large contributor to
xenophobic tensions. Percival and Homer-Dixon argue that certain resource scarcities in South Africa have played a role in increasing violence (1998), and Fisman and
Miguel also show how the shrinking of Lake Chad has led to more conflict in that region. In fact, other regions experiencing similar shrinking of resources have also had
up to a 30 percent greater chance of conflict (2008,111-35). Although these have less
to do with increased resource scarcity due to immigration, they still explain a similar
phenomenon: more incoming immigrants potentially strain resource and job supplies
and, therefore, cause more ethnic tension.
In the case of resource scarcity as it relates to jobs, it seems plausible that immigration into South Africa could possibly put a strain on job markets. Most African immigrants coming into South Africa are fleeing bad economic conditions in poorer parts
of Africa, such as neighboring Zimbabwe. Since many of the countries are poor and
less developed, few people coming from these countries are highly skilled. Even those
with good skills are sometimes not given good jobs and so have to work in low skill
positions (see Guardian 2010). In short, the immigrants in South Africa tend to be low
skill workers. What is more, because of their desperate situations, they are often more
willing than South"Africans to work for low wages. This leads to the conclusion that
the people who are most likely to dislike immigrants would be those with low skills or
low income; in other words, the people with whom immigrants are competing. In such
cases, a debate arises about who has a right to public goods (Wimmer 1997). When there
are fewer resources, locals become the judges of who can enjoy resources and who cannot. And often that means immigrants will be excluded or abused.
Much research has supported this idea. Alan Kessler argues there is a robust
relationship between lower income and education and xenophobia. Those people on
the lower spectrum of income and education tended to oppose immigration (2001).
27
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Eugene Campbell did a survey in Botswana asking natives their attitudes about immigrants (2003). He found that economic factors and nationalism both influenced
peoples' attitudes about immigrants. As Campbell puts it, "There is a strong desire
to preserve the 'fruits' of economic prosperity for citizens alone" (2003, 71). This
supports the income argument: those with more income are probably less worried
about losing the "fruits" of the country, since they have enough material benefits of
their own. Interestingly enough, the survey also revealed whites were favored over
other races and blacks were favored over Asians, especially Indians. Also supporting
this theory, Anna Maria Mayda did a cross country analysis looking at how skill levels correlate to attitudes on immigration (2006). She found people with lower skill
levels were generally more opposed to immigration. This also supports the resourcescarcity argument, since those persons with higher skills are often more able to find
jobs. As a counter argument to these explanations, some have argued that people
with more education are not necessarily less xenophobic, they are simply better at
giving more socially desirable answers (see Ostapczuk et al. 2009). However, Ostapczuk and his colleagues used a randomized response test with a lie detector and
found people with more education still tended to have less xenophobic attitudes than
those with lower education levels (2009).
There is also the argument that improved education and income will lead people
to be more open-minded and, therefore, willing to accept immigrants or other races.
There is less political science or economic research on this topic, but I will mention
some of the related literature. Hjerm has observed that Swedish youth who are better
educated tend to participate in democratic processes more, whereas those who are
less educated tend to resort to more violent measures and are, ultimately, more xenophobic (2005). Hainmueller and Hiscox strengthen this argument by showing Europeans with higher education levels are more open to the idea of immigration, regardless of whether they are unemployed or not, thus weakening the resource scarcity
(or labor competition) argument (2007). They say this indicates cultural norms have
a greater influence than economic incentives and education has tempering effects.
Although these analyses of xenophobia give us a general idea of some of the
attitudes and causes of xenophobia, they have two major problems. First of all, they
rely on methods that still fail to get an accurate measure of how people really feel.
In other words, they mostly rely on expressed preferences, which are not necessarily
the same as actual preferences. Even those methods that use something more still
have some problems, like the randomized response test with a lie detector. They try
to overcome some of the problems inherent in asking sensitive questions but still rely
on participants consciously having to take external social norms into account. More
importantly, however, they fail to admit the situation is far more complex than this
and the relationship between income, education, and xenophobia has a complicated
history throughout the world--especially in South Africa.
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Theory and Hypotheses
The dependent variable is xenophobia. I define this as hatred, dislike, or strong
mistrust of foreigners. The two independent variables are income and education. Income is money earned by a household, and education is years of schooling and types
of education (such as secondary school or university). Education is a more problematic variable because of varying levels of educational quality in South Africa. The
quality can be particularly low in townships such as the ones examined in this study
(see for example Fiske and Ladd 2004). However, in these cases, studies have shown
that job prospects for township residents can even be helped by low levels of education. Fryer and Vencatachellum show how women in a South African township,
Machibisa, have better job prospects even if they only have two years of secondary
school education. This implies that even if education quality in these areas is low,
education is still important and can influence job opportunities.
The four hypotheses I will focus on are:
1) Increased income and education will decrease xenophobia because of decreased "resource scarcity." This means those persons with low levels of income
or education have to compete for scarce jobs or resources more than richer or
more educated people do.
2) Increased income and education will decrease xenophobia because of a "cultural effect;" education makes people more open and tolerant of other ethnicities
so they are less likely to be antagonistic to others.
3) Increased income and education will not decrease xenophobia because the
relationship between the variables is too complex.
4) If income and education levels are too low, then they will not decrease
xenophobia

Methodology
Experiments
Since this study relies on quantitative data from a field experiment, I will briefly
discuss my reason for using experiments. In recent years, there has been an increase
in the social sciences of using experiments as a way to more accurately measure
causality. The debate about their effectiveness is extensive and some researchers
still strongly oppose them as a valid means of determining causality, while others
see them as a vital key in political science and economic research (see for example
Deaton 2009; Duflo et al. 2007). Although this debate is too extensive to cover here, I
will cover the most important points in order to justify my use of experimental data.
The biggest criticism is that experiments are not externally valid. There is some
legitimacy to this, yet just because they are not 100 percent externally valid does not
mean we should not make use of the insights we can gain from them. Well-designed
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SIGMA

experiments can provide powerful insights into why people behave in certain ways,
given certain circumstances. In other words, they give us a way to control all other
factors and focus on causality, something that observational data cannot do. Experiments are really a practical application of ceteris paribus, a fundamental assumption
in many disciplines. This assumption simplifies the tangle of data and potential
causal variables and can help provide understanding that would be unavailable
otherwise. I do not argue that the one approach is more important than the other
but rather that both experiments and observational data have their place in social
science research.

List Experiments
This study makes use of a relatively new tool: the list experiment. Because of
the potentially sensitive nature of some survey questions, respondents might not be
completely truthful (see Janus 2007). Even if anonymity is presumably guaranteed,
many respondents might have a desire to conceal their actual feelings. And those
persons who do not deliberately try to cover their true attitudes are often conditioned
to know what answers are socially acceptable or not, and perhaps do not even realize their own true feelings about other ethnicities. In other words, people often think
that they fit with societal rules even when they do not. In these cases, an unobtrusive
method is needed to get true answers to sensitive questions. In South Africa, where
the last five years have seen attempts at building a cohesive, multicultural society,
and where racial prejudice is certainly frowned upon, people might have even more
incentive to hide xenophobic attitudes, or try to convince themselves they are not really xenophobic. A setting like this makes it especially important to use unobtrusive
methods to ascertain racial attitudes.
The list experiment is a simple survey with two versions. In the control, participants are asked how many of the following make them angry (or asked how
many of the items they do regularly, etc.). In this example, all of the things on the
list are reasonable options for making someone angry. In the treatment, the rest of
the participants also receive a survey, but this time with one additional item, which
embodies the outcome of interest. Because the treatment group does not know their
questionnaire is different from the control group (which also makes it especially
important that participants do not see other people's questions), and because they
are only asked to say how many items, not which specific items, they assume their
answers are not particularly revealing. Further, because the items all seem like reasonable options to make people angry, the treatment is unobtrusive. However, by
doing a difference of means test between the two groups, we are able to see if the
treatment list, and particularly the treatment item, provokes a higher mean number
from treatment subjects vs. control subjects. If it does, then we can attribute the difference to the treatment.
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Here is an example of one of the lists that was used (Noyes 2009):
Table 1: Example of List Experiment: How many of the following make you angry?
Treatment

Control
Politicians who do not keep their promises

Politicians who do not keep their promises

The unemployment rate

The unemployment rate

High prices (for example: food and gas
prices)

High prices (for example: food and gas
prices)

High crime rates

High crime rates
Immigrants moving into your community

There were two list questions, each with two different treatments, meaning that
each participant got one of four options, or a control. The first list asked "How many
of the following make you angry?" The second question was "How many of the following influenced your vote in the recent presidential elections?" Each list also had
either a specifically anti-immigrant xenophobia question, or a question relating to the
recent election in 2009. Here are all four treatments used in the two list experiments
(Noyes 2010):
Table 2: Questions and Treatments
List
List 1
How many of the following
make you angry?
List 2
How many of the
following influenced
your vote in the recent
presidential elections?

Xenophobia treatment

Election treatment

(Treatment 1-1)

(Treatment 1-2)

Immigrants moving
into your community

Having a president who is not of
the same tribal ethnicity

(Treatment 2-1)

(Treatment 2-2)

Promises made by
candidates or parties
to take measures to
counter immigration

Ethnicity of candidate

Experiment Design
The data was collected by Ken Noyes, in the summer of 2009, as part of his
research on the effects of ethnicity on xenophobia (see Noyes 2009). I am using his
data set to look at the effects of education and income, variables he did not look at.
The subjects in the study all come from three townships (slum-like settlements in
South Africa): Davy ton, close to Johannesburg; Mdantsane, near East London; and
Umlazi, situated near Durban. These townships were chosen because they seem to
be a good representation of ethnicities in South Africa (excluding whites), in the
hopes of getting a rough map of overall South African attitudes. Umlazi is mainly
a Zulu township, Mdantsane is mainly Xhosa, and Davyton is a relatively good
representation of all the other South African ethnicities (Noyes 2009). The other
ethnicities are Swati, Ndebele, Sotho, Pedi, Tswana, Tsonga, and Venda (Britannica
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2010). All nine of these major ethnic groups make up the majority of South African
blacks, with Zulu and Xhosa being the dominant groups. Of course, a completely
ideal survey would have chosen randomly from different places in South Africa,
in the hopes of getting a truly accurate distribution of observations. However, this
data ostensibly still gives a more-or-Iess accurate depiction of what black South
Africans feel when it comes to xenophobia. Since this was the first such experiment
in South Africa, it is not meant as an exhaustive survey but rather an attempt to get
an idea of xenophobia in South Africa.
The data was collected by local university students familiar with the area. Zones
were randomly chosen, as were routes and starting houses in these zones. The recruiters went at various assigned times to every third door and randomly chose an adult
candidate for participation. They were then offered the opportunity to participate in
a study about South Africa's ethnic groups, and to receive 60 Rand (about $6). If the
person accepted, they were handed an invitation to go to a local school where the research would be carried out. The invitation had the person's name on it as well as the
time they were to come, to make sure the right person came to the study. When they
came to the study, they were instructed on how to use the basic computer program
and then did a survey about basic background information, as well as their responses
to the list experiments.
The background questions asked them about their ethnicity, party affiliation, predominant language, where they were born, where they live, and information about
income and education (see Appendix). For education, people were offered increments
of schooling, which made a scale of one to seven, one being "no schooling" and seven
being "completed university or polytechnic" (see table 3). For income, people were
offered increments of annual earnings (see table 4). The lowest income was "R5,000
or less" (about $500), and the highest was "R90 467 and above" (about $9,000). To get
an idea of what purchasing power in South Africa is like, the rand-dollar exchange
rate at the time of the study was about R 10 to $1, and gas cost about R7 a liter in 2009,
which converted to about $0.70 a liter, or $2.66 per gallon ("Petrol Prices," Mail &
Guardian, 27 February 2009). Other examples include: two liters of milk R18 ($1.80),
jeans R150-250 ($15-25), movie ticket R20-50 ($2-5), and pizza R30-65 ($3--6.50)
(Monash University 2009).
Education and income levels were generally low but perhaps not as low as expected. The mean for education was 4.621, with 659 observations, a standard deviation
of 1.193, and minimum one and maximum seven (see Figure 1). The 4.621 mean implies
most people had either completed secondary school or had some secondary school.
As for income, the great majority of people fell into the lowest range, R5,OOO or
less. The mean was 1.935, with 650 observations, a standard deviation of 1.387, and
responses ranging from 1--6 (see figure 2).
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Figure 1: Level of schooling completed
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1: No schooling; 2: Some primary; 3: Completed primary school; 4:
Some secondary school; 5: Completed secondary school; 6: Some university or polytechnic; 7: Completed university or polytechnic

Figure 2: Yearly Household Income
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1: RS,OOO or less; 2: RS,001-11,378; 3: Rll,379-20,202; 4: R20,20~,402;

5: RJ:!j,043-90,466; 6: R90,467 and above

Results
The control and treatment results for income were obtained by dividing all responses into high income and low income, each group making up about half of the
responses. I labeled those with income of "one" as low income and all the others as
high income in order to evenly split the data. Otherwise, there were too few observations in "high income." Even with this divide, there were still slightly more people in
the low-income group. I then took all people who answered the control and were high
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income and combined them into a variable called "control high income." I then took
all the high-income people who answered the treatment and made them a variable
called "treatment high income." I conducted comparison of the means test, to see if
there was a difference between the control and treatment high income groups. The
next step was to take the low-income control and low-income treatment and compare
them. To see if there is a difference between high income and low income, I looked
at the 90 percent and 95 percent confidence intervals. If there was no overlap, I concluded there was a significant difference between high and low income. If they did
overlap, then there was no significant difference.
For education, I also divided the data, as evenly as possible, into high and low
income. I made levels one through four low education and five through seven high
education. This was also done to evenly split the data so high education was not too
small. Since there were such a large number in five (completed secondary school), the
high education group is slightly larger, as can be seen in the data. I then did the same
for income so I had variables for those that answered the control and had high or low
education, and then the same for those who answered the treatment.

Income
Treatment 1-1
Variable

High
Income
Low
Income

Control
Mean

N

Treatment
Mean

N

Difference

2.654
(0.118)

81

3.654
(0.138)

91

-0.609
(0.184)

2.618
(0.108)

110

3.356
(0.124)

118

-0.734
(0.165)

95% CI

90%CI

-0.972

-0.912

to

to

-0.247

-0.306

-1.063

-1.001

to

to

-0.412

-0.463

T
Value
-3.317

-4.467

The survey for this question was the first list experiment, which asked how
many of the following makes you angry. The first treatment, the one this table is
about, was "Immigrants moving into your community." Although there is a statistically significant difference between the control and the treatment, as can be seen by
the strong t-values, when comparing high and low income there is little difference.
The 95 percent confidence interval for high income is -0.972 to -0.247 and for low
income it is -1.063 to -0.412. Although low income has a slightly larger difference, the
confidence intervals still overlap, which means there is no statistical difference. In
other words, all we can tell from this data is there is xenophobia against immigrants,
but high- or low-income people are not any more prone to be xenophobic. Even with
90 percent confidence intervals, and at the risk of committing Type I error, there is
still not enough statistical difference. In other words, at the 95 percent and 90 percent
levels, there is no statistical difference.
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Treatment 1-2
Variable

Control
Mean

High
Income

2.654
(0.118)

Low
Income

2.618
(0.108)

N
81

110

Treatment
Mean
3.061
(0.133)

3.349
(0.123)

N
97

106

Difference

95%CI

90%CI

T
Value

-00407

-0.764

-0.706

-2.254

(0.181)

to

to

-0.247

-0.108

-1.053

-1.001

-0.731
(0.163)

to

to

-0.409

..().461

-4.476

The question for this treatment, in response to being asked how many of the following make you angry, was "Having a president who is not of the same tribal ethnicity
as you are." Once again, although there is a difference from the control in both cases,
there is no difference between high and low. The 95 percent CI for high income goes
from 0.764 to -0.247 and for low income it goes from -1.053 to -0.409. Since there is
overlap here, we can infer there is no difference between high and low income. The
same goes for the 90 percent CI: once again, there is still quite a large overlap. Therefore, we can say, at the 90 percent and 95 percent confidence levels, there is no difference between high and low income in influencing xenophobic attitudes. In short, the
only thing we know yet is that xenophobia exists against immigrants and high or low
income is not an influencing factor.
Treatment 2-1
Control
Mean

N

Treatment
Mean

N

Difference

High
Income

3.265
(0.113)

92

3.524
(0.144)

86

-0.258
(0.182)

Low
Income

2.927
(0.109)

110

3.214
(0.136)

126

Variable

-0.287
(0.178)

95%CI

90%CI

-0.617

-0.557

to

to

0.101

0.041

-0.637

-0.580

to

to

0.063

0.006

T
Value
-1.420

-1.614

These are the results from the second list of questions, where participants were asked
how many of the following influenced their voting in the most recent elections, held
in 2009. The treatment for this list was "Promises made by candidates or parties to
take measures to counter immigration." In this case, there is not a statistical difference
between the treatment and the control, which means this was probably not a significant enough issue for these people in this election. In addition, there is no difference
between high and low income, at the 90 percent or at the 95 percent significance levels.
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Treatment 2-2
Variable

Control
Mean

N

Treatment
Mean

N

Difference

95%CI

High
Income

3.265
(0.113)

92

3.253
(0.132)

87

0.012
(0.173)

-0.329

-0.273

to 0.354

to 0.297

Low
Income

2.927
(0.108)

110

3.494
(0.144)

102

-0.494
(0.179)

-0.846

to
-0.146

90%CI

T
Value
0.071

-0.788

to

-2.769

-0.200

This is also from the second list of questions, i.e., the question of how many of these
factors influenced your vote in the most recent election, and the question for the treatment in this one was "Ethnicity of candidate." Once again, the results are not statistically significant, in other words, ethnicity of the candidate did not playa major role
for most of these people. Further, there is no difference between high income and low
income, neither at the 90 percent level or the 95 percent significance levels.
Education
Treatment 1-1
Variable

Control
Mean

N

Treatment
Mean

N

Difference

High
Education

2.778
(0.096)

117

3.283
(0.116)

127

-0.506
(0.152)

Low
Education

2.405
(0.135)

74

3.366
(0.152)

82

-0.960
(0.205)

95%

CI
-0.805

90% CI

T
Value

-0.756

to

to

-0.206

-0.256

-1.365

-1.297

to

to

-0.556

-0.6227

-3.329

-4.693

These data are once again from the first list experiment, where the question was
"How many of the following make you angry," and where this particular treatment
is "Immigrants moving into your community." Instead of being divided by income,
the divide is by education, where the low-education group is represented from levels
one to four and the high-education group in levels five to seven. In this case, there
is a statistically significant difference between the control and the treatment means,
for both high and low education, implying that immigration makes both groups upset. However, the confidence intervals for high and low both overlap, so we can infer there is no difference between high and low education in mitigating xenophobia
against immigrants.
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Treatment 1-2

Variable

Control
Mean

N

Treatment
N
Mean

Difference 95%CI

90%CI

TValue

2.778
High
Education (0.096)

117

3.264
(0.113)

121

-0.487
(0.149)

-0.780 to
-0.193

-0.732 to
-0.2418

-3.266

Low
2.405
Education (0.135)

74

3.134
(0.150)

82

-0.729
(0.203)

-1.130 to
-0.327

-1.063 to
-0.395

-3.586

This is also in response to the question of how many of the following make you angry, and the specific treatment is "Having a president who is not of the same tribal
ethnicity." There is a difference between the treatment and the mean, but there is no
difference between the CIs of high and low education, meaning high education and
low education do not make a difference in influencing xenophobia.
Treatment 2-1

Variable

Control
Mean

N

Treatment
Mean

N

Difference

95%CI

90%CI

TValue

High
Education

3.176
(0.098)

127

3.456
(0.127)

125

-0.280
(0.160)

-0.595 to
0.036

-0.543 to
-0.017

-1.745

Low
Education

2.920
(0.133)

75

3.172
(0.161)

87

-0.252
(0.213)

-0.673 to
0.168

-0.602 to
0.098

-1.185

These data come from the second list experiment, asking "How many of the following influenced your vote in the last election." The treatment is "Promises made by
candidates or parties to take measures to counter immigration." As in all the previous
examples, there is no difference between high and low education, and the results are
also not particularly statistically significant either.
Treatment 2-2

Variable

Control
Mean

N

Treatment
Mean

N

Difference

95%CI

90% CI

TValue

High
Education

3.176
(0.098)

127

3.439
(0.130)

107

-0.263
(0.160)

-0.578 to
0.052

-0.526 to
0.0002

-1.646

Low
Education

2.929
(0.133)

75

3.220
(0.151)

82

-0.300
(0.203)

-0.700 to
0.101

-0.634 to
0.034

-1.477

These data ask how many of the factors on the list influenced your vote with the treatment of "Ethnicity of candidate." In this case, there is little difference between control
and mean, and there is also no difference between high education and low education.

Discussion and Implications
In short, the results show that education and income were not significant predictors of xenophobia. This could have varying implications. First, it could mean levels
of income and education in this study were too low to show any difference. This
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might have been the case since many of the people had only a secondary school education. Perhaps education only has effects after much higher levels, like a university
degree. Secondary school does not open up a lot of job opportunities, so these people
would tend to be low-skill workers. But, as already indicated by the Fryer and Vencatachellum study, even low levels of education can help people escape from greater
job vulnerability. Yet, there are still problems with such an explanation because even
high levels of education do not always lead to high job safety. This is especially true
of the outsourcing or off-shoring of jobs. At least in these cases, ~e people "stealing"
jobs are too far away to be attacked. But either way, high- and low-skill jobs are both
vulnerable to a certain degree.
As for the idea of certain stages of education being necessary to prevent xenophobia (secondary school diploma, college degree, etc.), we find some evidence. This
is seen in that many of the immigrants attacked have been low-skill workers, and so
it would be other low-skill workers from South Africa who were competing for the
same jobs. On the other hand, even high-skilled workers from other countries are
sometimes forced to work in low-skill jobs, because low-skill jobs are the only ones
that will accept them (Guardian 2010). Even in these cases of higher skills, legal and
illegal immigrants are perceived as a threat to low-skill jobs. However, as already explained before, this is still a problematic explanation, since many segregationist and
violently xenophobic systems in the past, such as apartheid, slavery, or racial persecution, have often been carried out by the richer and more educated.
This leads to the other hypothesis that education can make people more tolerant and open, and so less xenophobic. In this scenario, more "enlightened" people
would not engage in burning down the homes of immigrants, beating them, and
dispelling them from communities. Most people in the West, while normally more
educated and wealthy, were shocked when they saw the anti-immigrant violence
2008. Yet, it is exactly these countries that have carried out some of the most brutal
and harsh treatment of perceived "inferior" populations. Past sins aside, the West
is far from resolving all of its racial problems. Blacks in America are still less likely
to get jobs they are just as qualified for as white people (see Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004), and the prisons are still disproportionately full of African-Americans
(see Herbert 2010). And there is still the recent furor over the mosque and Islamic
center in Manhattan, where people objected to a mosque and Islamic cultural center
being built so close to ground zero (see Wright 2010). Such unwillingness shows
Americans are still not so comfortable with other races yet and still struggle to a
certain extent to trust the other.
Along these lines, Europe, another high-income and high-education area, is also
enmeshed in its own racial and xenophobic turmoil. Several European countries have
banned wearing hijabs and other religious covering. For an excellent look at some of
these arguments and why none of them are worthy of a liberal democratic tradition,
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such as Western Europe's, see Martha Nussbaum's article, "Veiled Threats?" (2010).
She goes through arguments used against the hijab and shows how they are double
standards-if these politicians really meant what they said, they would also ban high
heels, pornography, and liposuction, and not allow people to wear scarves in the
winter. In short, these seemingly neutral laws are badly disguised and hypocritical
attacks on Muslims. Further, in the Netherlands, when Theo van Gogh was killed
by a Muslim, there was massive outrage and a general feeling this was additional
evidence Muslims were dangerous and radical. Yet when Pim Fortuyn was murdered
the year before by an environmentalist, environmentalists were not seen as radical
extremists, and there was no banning of environmentalist movements or the likes.
As a final example, Switzerland, a supposedly free country, banned minarets on new
mosques, by popular referendum. This is even more disturbing, because it shows a
majority of the population, and not just some small group of politicians, were willing
to make a law that limited the rights of a small minority group. All of these cases demonstrate countries that are supposedly free and tolerant, not to mention educated and
wealthy, have many laws and attitudes that are xenophobic in nature. Therefore, even
though education might temper some people against xenophobia, such as education
about other people or places, it is still not a universal guarantor against xenophobia
and does not automatically improve interracial relations all of the time or even necessarily most of the time. Therefore, these results are further evidence that income and
education are inherently complex variables when it comes to solving ethnic tensions
and xenophobic violence.

Limitations, External Validity, and Further Research
Although these results are intriguing, this study is limited in various ways. For
one, the data is not exhaustive, it only shows three townships. Although the townships were selected by the original researchers in an effort to get a representation of
all South African black ethnicities, they are still a small observation on the total demographics of South Africa. Further research would need to be done to fully ascertain
the extent of racial perceptions throughout South Africa. Furthermore, the data is limited, because it only shows one snapshot in time and does not really indicate trends
over time or trends'without external shocks, such as elections and their accompanying rhetoric, as was the case in this study set during the 2009 elections. Nevertheless,
it does provide an idea of racial attitudes and trends in South Africa today.
Perhaps this research can still be applied to the rest of South Africa. For one, the
fact there are so many townships like the ones in this study means such results probably hold true for a large number of South Africans. Whether or not this also applies
to the higher levels of South African society remains to be determined by further
research. As for external validity to other countries, few places have such a starkly
stratified society like South Africa's, where the education and income gaps were ex39
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acerbated by segregationist legislation. South Africa provides a fairly unique picture
of xenophobia. However, there are many ways the lessons learned in South Africa
can be applied elsewhere. Many other African countries have slums like the South
African townships; these results probably also apply for groups of people there. And
apart from Africa, there are many other places in the world that also have similar settings, so these conclusions might also apply there, too.
Further research would also need to be done using these types of surveys to see
which people from all sorts of backgrounds in South Africa are ~ore xenophobicnot just black people in slums. Perhaps such research would show people with college degrees are less likely to be xenophobic. In any case, the most logical step after
this research is to include all backgrounds. This would either strengthen the conclusion that higher education and income are actually not good at decreasing xenophobia, or perhaps weaken these conclusions. Both would have significant implications.

Conclusion
This paper has found varying evidence for the three hypotheses discussed earlier. There is some evidence for the resource scarcity explanation since it can be
argued that the education levels here are still too small to make a difference to show
people being able to escape significant job competition. Perhaps a greater threshold
of education would be needed to see significant decreases in xenophobia. On the
other hand, there is little evidence for the cultural explanation, because each year
of schooling would be expected to make people more educated and open, whereas
only certain levels of education will be any use for people looking for work. Each
added year would be expected to moderate people, since this is unrelated to job
availability. But finally, the most conclusive evidence from these tests is the whole
story is more complicated. Education and income did not seem to make people any
less xenophobic. This goes with the observation that much racial persecution over
time has been perpetrated by richer, more educated people. Therefore, the implications are not as straightforward as increasing education and income. Perhaps this
means education needs to be specifically geared toward decreasing anti-immigrant
xenophobia and not just focused on abstract ideas of liberal democratic values. Another implication is that immigrants need greater protection, since they are often
likely to be persecuted and be more vulnerable, no matter what the situation. Most
of all, we need to take a less simplistic approach to dealing with immigrants and
admit that any of us might be guilty of xenophobia-not just the people beating
immigrants in the streets.
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